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PRACTICE NOTE
SUPPLEMENTING THE RECORD IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS: WHAT IF THE EVIDENCE
YOU NEED IS NOT IN THE RECORD?
George C. Harris* and Xiang Li**
I. INTRODUCTION

The federal courts of appeals review district court orders
and judgments on the basis of a closed record, which is limited
to materials in the record when the district court made the
decision under review.' This limitation is "fundamental"
because appellate courts "lack the means to authenticate
*Litigation Partner, Morrison & Foerster, San Francisco.
**Litigation Associate, Morrison & Foerster, San Francisco.
1. See e.g. Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon, 807 F.2d 1150, 1165 (3d Cir. 1986)

(pointing out that "[t]he only proper function of a court of appeals is to review the decision
below on the basis of the record that was before the district court"). A district court record
includes "(1) the original papers and exhibits filed in the district court; (2) the transcripts of
proceedings, if any; and (3) a certified copy of the docket entries prepared by the district
clerk." Fed. R. App. P. 10(a). Consequently, "papers not filed with the district court or
admitted into evidence by that court are not part of the record on appeal." Barcamerica
Intl. USA Trust v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 593-94 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation
omitted); but see Riordan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 589 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir.

2009) (holding that a pretrial order delivered into the possession of the clerk was part of the
record when it had been submitted for review by the court and had been referenced in a
motion, even though it was not officially filed).
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS Vol. 14, No. 2 (Fall 2013)
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documents" and must rely on the district court's designation of
submitted documents as part of the record. 2 "Litigants who
disregard this process impair [the courts'] ability to perform
[their] appellate function.
But what if highly relevant documents on the key issue of
intent come to light after the district court has dismissed your
client's contract case on summary judgment? And what if the
newly uncovered documents were responsive to discovery
requests and within the possession of the opposing party? Are
you simply out of luck? Or are there ways to supplement the
record on appeal with those documents? What if a new witness
comes forward with potential testimonial statements that
strongly refute a key finding of fact made against your client in
the district court? Is there anything you can do to get the court of
appeals to consider a sworn statement by the witness?
Fortunately, the general rule of a closed appellate record is
not absolute. Attorneys requesting that federal courts of appeals
consider materials not in the district court record can rely on
three possible avenues to supplement the record on appeal:
(1) Rule 10(e)(2)(C) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, (2) Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and
(3) the inherent equitable authority of the federal courts of
appeals. 4 This article uses hypothetical scenarios to examine the
various contexts in which each of these avenues may present a
means of supplementing the record on appeal.

2. See Lowry v. Barnhart,329 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2003).
3. Id.

4. See id. (citing Fed. R. App. P. 10(e)(2)(C) and Fed. R. Evid. 201, and listing the
three exceptions to the general rule of reviewing a closed record). Rule 48 of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure also provides for appellate fact-finding in the form of
appointing a "special master to hold hearings, if necessary, and to recommend factual
findings and disposition in matters ancillary to proceedings in the court." Fed. R. App. P.
48. The Advisory Committee Note indicates, however, that the Rule is not intended to alter
the practice of remanding unresolved factual issues to trial courts, but applies instead to
ancillary matters such as the "application for fees or eligibility for Criminal Justice Act
status on appeal." Fed. R. App. P. 48, advisory comm. n. Thus, while Rule 48 allows for
supplementation of the appellate record with evidence not in the district court record, its
limited purpose greatly restricts the nature of the evidence permitted.
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II. Is THERE ANY WAY TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD IF ...

A. Scenario I
In a breach of contract action over an asset-purchase
agreement, there is a dispute about the parties' intent as to
whether certain patent rights are included. Communications
between the opposing party and third parties evidencing an
intent to include the rights come to light only after the court
has dismissed the case on summary judgment against your
client. The communications were within the scope of
discovery requests and in the opposing party's possession
at the time of discovery. On appeal, is there anything you
can do to introduce the newly discovered communications?
1. Rule 10(e) (2) (C)of the FederalRules ofAppellate Procedure
and Rule 201 of the FederalRules ofEvidence
FRAP 10(e)(2)(C) and FRE 201 will not help you here.
They apply only in very specific and narrow circumstancescorrecting inadvertent omissions under FRAP 10(e)(2)(C) or
taking judicial notice of highly indisputable facts or directly
related court proceedings under FRE 201.
a. Rule 10(e)(2)(C)
Intended to permit correction of the appellate record to
accurately reflect what happened in the district court,' FRAP 10
(e)(2) provides that
[i]f anything material to either party is omitted from or
misstated in the record by error or accident, the omission or
misstatement may be corrected and a supplemental record
may be certified and forwarded:
(A) on stipulation of the parties;
(B) by the district court before or after the record has
been forwarded; or
(C)by the court of appeals.
5. See U.S. ex rel. Mulvaney v. Rush, 487 F.2d 684, 687 n. 5 (3d Cir. 1973).
6. Fed. R. App. P. 10(e)(2).
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Accordingly, most federal courts of appeals interpret FRAP
10(e)(2) to allow supplementing the appellate record "only to
correct inadvertent omissions, not to introduce new evidence."
The courts of appeals are willing to supplement the record with
materials not in the district record only if the materials were
relied on in the district court proceedings and would have been
introduced into the district court record but for inadvertent
omission.8
For example, in Ross v. Kemp, the Eleventh Circuit
permitted a deposition to supplement the record even though it
had not been filed in accordance with the then-recently changed
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 9 The court found the omission
inadvertent because (1) the party seeking to supplement the
record had reasonably believed the deposition was filed in
accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in effect at
the time of taking the deposition, and (2) both parties had relied
on the deposition as part of the record in their pleadings.' 0
Similarly, in Brown v. Home Insurance Company, the Eighth
Circuit permitted a deposition to supplement the record when
the party seeking to supplement had referenced the deposition in

7. In re Application ofAdan, 437 F.3d 381, 388 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2006); accord George v.

Smith, 586 F.3d 479, 486 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2009) (denying supplementation when the evidence
sought to be introduced was "essentially brand new" because it was never offered to the
trial court until after the appeals process had begun); Inland Bulk Transfer Co. v. Cummins
Engine Co., 332 F.3d 1007, 1012 (6th Cir. 2003) (characterizing an attempt "to add new
material that was never considered by the district court" as "not permitted under the rule");
U.S. v. Page, 661 F.2d 1080, 1082 (5th Cir. 1981) (explaining that "[w]hat in fact went on
below may be settled and placed of record pursuant to Rule 10(e)," and noting that
"whatever proceedings are necessary to that end are permissible," but that "[n]ew
proceedings of a substantive nature, designed to supply what might have been done but was
not, are beyond the reach of the rule").
8. See Adams v. Holland, 330 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2003) ("Thus, the purpose of
amendment under this rule is to ensure that the appellate record accurately reflects the
record before the District Court, not to provide this Court with new evidence not before the
District Court, even if the new evidence is substantial.") (citation omitted; emphasis in
original); Thompson v. Bell, 373 F.3d 688, 690 (6th Cir. 2004) (adhering to court's
"previous interpretation that Rule 10(e) does not allow inclusion in the appellate record of
material that the district court did not consider"), reversed on othergrounds, 545 U.S. 794
(2005). The Tenth Circuit has even refused supplementation under FRAP 10(e)(2) when
the omission arose from logistical or technical difficulties encountered at the district court
level by a pro se litigant. Duvall v. Putnam City Sch. Dist., 530 Fed. Appx. 804, 806 n. 1
(10th Cir. 2013).
9. See 785 F.2d 1467, 1471-72 (11th Cir. 1986).
10. Id.
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a motion for summary judgment but had failed to file the
deposition with the district court."
Even if the omission from the district court record was not
inadvertent,
some federal
courts of appeals
allow
supplementation under FRAP 10(e)(2) when (1) the proffered
materials bear heavily on the merits of the issue before the
court,12 (2) a new issue arises on appeal,13 (3) the subject of
appellate review is a habeas petition or an appeal from an
administrative proceeding,14 or (4) the proffered materials have
been stipulated to by both parties.' 5 But aside from those
11. 176 F.3d 1102, 1104 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1999).
12. In reviewing a criminal defendant's allegations of ineffective assistance, which
were premised on trial counsel's failure to move for suppression of particular evidence, the
Second Circuit permitted supplementation of the appellate record because the government
had provided defendant's trial counsel with the materials but had never filed them with the
district court. See U.S. v. Aulet, 618 F.2d 182, 185-87 (2d Cir. 1980). The Second Circuit
reasoned that because the omitted materials may have been the very reason that prompted
defendant's trial counsel to forgo the motion to suppress, the court could not justify
"ignoring these materials which bear heavily on the merits of [defendant's] claim." Id. at
187. The reader should note that permitting supplementation with materials that "bear
heavily on the merits" is likely limited to the context of habeas petitions. See infra Part
11(d) (discussing the courts' demonstration of particular leniency in permitting requests by
habeas petitioners to supplement the record). Otherwise, such a potentially broad exception
risks undermining the general rule of a closed appellate record. A federal court of appeals
may also permit supplementing the appellate record with materials that the district court
excluded when that evidentiary ruling is itself on appeal. See e.g. U.S. v. Stoltz, 683 F.3d
934, 936 n. 3 (8th Cir. 2012).
13. If a new issue arises on appeal, the Third Circuit has permitted supplementation
under FRAP 10(e) when both parties agreed to stipulate to a fact relating to a potential
mootness barrier. Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1114 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1992).
14. In cases of judicial review of administrative proceedings or habeas petitions, the
federal courts of appeals have also demonstrated willingness to supplement the record with
materials from state courts or agency proceedings, even if they were omitted from the
district court record. See ML. v. Fed. Way Sch. Dist., 394 F.3d 634, 641 n. 8 (9th Cir.
2005) (granting supplementation of the appellate record with testimony from the
administrative proceeding because a reviewing court must examine the administrative
record as a whole, even if the district court record did not include the testimony in
question); Crockett v. Hulick, 542 F.3d 1183, 1188 n. 3 (7th Cir. 2008) (granting
supplementation of the record with jurors' affidavits and accountability instruction from a
habeas petition).
15. See Williams v. Drake, 146 F.3d 44, 50 n. 6 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting that "[a]lthough
the trial transcript is silent on the magistrate's response to the removal request, the parties
have filled the gap by stipulating to the substance of the magistrate's reply," and accepting
that stipulation); Jeffrey C. Dobbins, New Evidence on Appeal, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 2016,
2034 (2012) ("Courts and commentators will occasionally suggest that stipulation by the
parties can permit a court to consider evidence that was not before the trial court."); but see
also id. ("On the other hand, there is plenty of case law supporting the traditional rule,
under which appellate courts will refuse to consider supplemental evidence on appeal even
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specific exceptions, federal courts of appeals generally interpret

FRAP 10(e) to permit supplementation only to correct
inadvertent omission and not to add to the appellate record
matters not considered by the district court.1 6
b. Rule 201
Under FRE 201, federal courts of appeals can take judicial
notice of highly indisputable facts or other court proceedings
that directly relate to the issues on appeal. The general rule of
appellate review based on a closed record "is subject to the right
of an appellate court in a proper case to take judicial notice of
new developments not considered by the lower court."1 7 Parties
may in consequence seek to supplement the appellate record
with new materials that meet the FRE 201 requirements.
The Rule provides that, at any stage of the proceedings, a
federal court of appeals may take judicial notice of "adjudicative
facts" that are not subject to reasonable dispute because they are
"generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court" or "can be accurately and readily determined from
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."
Thus, a "high degree of indisputability is the essential
prerequisite" to courts' taking judicial notice.'
In addition to highly indisputable facts relating to a pending
case, the federal courts of appeals may take judicial notice of a
proceeding in another court if the proceeding has a direct

when the parties are willing to stipulate to its accuracy and to its inclusion in the appellate
record."); cf Jones v. Jackson Natl. Life Ins. Co., 819 F. Supp. 1385, 1387 (W.D. Mich.

1993) (refusing to augment district court record on the basis of parties' stipulation, and
pointing out that "[t]o the extent there may be an 'inherent equitable power' to supplement
the record exceeding the power provided in Rule 10(e), such power is to be exercised not
by this Court, but by the Court of Appeals") (citations omitted). See infra Part II(a)(2) for a
discussion of courts' inherent equitable power. Individual courts may also have local rules
that permit supplementation of the appellate record with unopposed materials. See e.g.
Duvall, 530 Fed. Appx. at 806 n. I (noting that "[u]nder its authority pursuant to Tenth
Circuit Rule 27.3(A)(3), the clerk granted the unopposed portion of Ms. Duvall's
motion [to supplement]").
16. See Brock A. Swartzle, Using "Inherent Equitable Authority" to Expand the

Record on Appeal, App. Prac. J. 1, 3 (Fall 2010).
17. See e.g. Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 151 (3d Cir. 1973).
18. Fed. R. Evid. 201(a), (b), (d).
19. Fed. R. Evid. 201, advisory comm. n.
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connection to the issues on appeal.20 For example, in review of
habeas petitions, a federal court of appeals may take judicial
notice of the relevant state court documents even if they were
not a part of the district court record.2 '
Here in Scenario 1, the documents you want to bring to the
attention of the court of appeals were not inadvertently omitted
from the record by the party seeking their introduction, and are
not highly indisputable facts in your case or a directly related
court proceeding. Thus, neither FRAP 10(e)(2)(C) nor FRE 201
will be a basis to supplement the record with those documents.
2. Inherent EquitableAuthority
What about the court's inherent equitable authority? Parties
may request that the court exercise its inherent equitable
authority to supplement the appellate record when changes in
the law affect the outcome or when changes in the facts affect
the suitability of injunctive relief or the court's subject-matter
jurisdiction. And, even in the absence of such changed
circumstances, courts are inclined to exercise inherent equitable
authority if supplementing the record will advance the principles
of fairness, truth, or judicial efficiency.
A majority of circuits recognize the existence of the courts'
equitable authority to supplement the appellate record as justice
requires regardless of inadvertent omission, though the courts
rarely exercise that power absent extraordinary circumstances.2 2
20. See PhilipsMed. Sys. Intl., B. V. v. Bruetman, 982 F.2d 211, 215 (7th Cir. 1992).

21. See White v. Gaetz, 588 F.3d 1135, 1137 n. 2 (7th Cir. 2009) (taking judicial notice
of state court transcript); Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 815 (9th Cir. 2002) (taking
judicial notice of the tolling period based on documents in state case that had a direct
relationship to federal habeas appeal); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239
(4th Cir. 1989) (taking judicial notice of appellees' guilty pleas because they "are most
relevant and critical," involving "the very property and issues involved in this
proceeding").
22. See Ross, 785 F.2d at 1474-75; see also Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs.,

Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 227 (3d Cir. 2009); Adan, 437 F.3d at 388 n. 3; Gibson v. Blackburn,
744 F.2d 403, 405 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1984); Turk v. U.S., 429 F.2d 1327, 1329 (8th Cir. 1970);
Lowry, 329 F.3d at 1024 (referring to "unusual circumstances"); Rio Grande Silvery
Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1110 n. 11 (10th Cir. 2010)

(recognizing power but declining to exercise it); U.S. v. Kennedy, 225 F.3d 1187, 1192
(10th Cir. 2000); Dickerson v. Ala., 667 F.2d 1364, 1367 n. 5 (11th Cir. 1982); Colbertv.
Potter, 471 F.3d 158, 165-66 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 371 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
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Some courts have held that this authority is implicit in FRAP

10(e) 23 while others treat it as a part of the courts' inherent
equitable powers.24 Because FRAP 10(e) in its terms provides
for supplementation only to correct inadvertent omission, this
article categorizes such equitable authority as an exercise of
inherent power.
The Sixth Circuit has slowly trended towards embracing
the concept of inherent equitable authority to supplement the
appellate record, and, in particular, has recently exercised the
power in reviewing habeas petitions.2 5 While willing to allow
supplementation based on inherent equitable authority in some
circumstances, the Eleventh Circuit has made it clear that
exercise of this inherent power is "entirely inappropriate" when
a federal court of appeals reviews a case for plain error and
examines the record before the district court for error that is
"clear or obvious."2 6
A federal court of appeals exercises its inherent equitable
authority to supplement the record when (1) changes in the
pertinent law affect the outcome,2 7 or (2) changes in the facts
23. See e.g. Aulet, 618 F.2d at 187; Mill Bridge V, Inc. v. Benton, 496 Fed. Appx. 170,

174 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2012) ("We have recognized that in limited circumstances, we may have
the equitable power under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e) to allow a party to
supplement the record with documents that were not presented to the District Court.").
24. See e.g. Schwartz v. Millon Air, Inc., 341 F.3d 1220, 1225 n. 4 (11th Cir. 2003);

Lowry, 329 F.3d at 1024; see also Dobbins,supra n. 15, at 2035.
25. Compare In re Fisher,296 Fed. Appx. 494, 503 (6th Cir. 2008) ("[W]e need not
decide whether to recognize an inherent authority to supplement the record."), with U.S. v.
Murdock, 398 F.3d 491, 500-01 (6th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the defendant's request to
supplement the record after concluding that the equities did not demand the proffered
materials be added to the record), and Thompson, 373 F.3d 688 (exercising the court's
inherent equitable power to supplement the record in the case of a habeas petitioner facing
capital punishment).
26. See US. v. Brown, 526 F.3d 691, 707 (1lth Cir. 2008) (describing the court of
appeals as "looking over the trial judge's shoulder, examining what was before the judge,"
noting that the affidavit in question "was not before the district court," and declining in
consequence "to supplement the record and consider it"), vacated and remanded, 556 U.S.
1150 (2009).
27. The Supreme Court has held that courts of appeal are required to "consider any
change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened" since the disputed decision was
issued. Patterson v. Ala., 294 U.S. 600, 607 (1935); Watts, Watts & Co. v. Unione

Austriaca Di Navigazione, 248 U.S. 9, 21 (1918). In a case in which these changes alter the
suitability of the outcome or of any injunctive relief, the court of appeals may remand the
case to the district court to supplement the record. See Adan, 437 F.3d at 389 n. 3; Gomez
v. Wilson, 477 F.2d 411, 416-17 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (denying request for supplementation on
appeal but remanding for supplementation of the pleadings below in light of changes in the
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alter either the suitability of injunctive reliefe 8 or the court's
subject-matter jurisdiction.2 9 In the absence of these specific
circumstances, the court evaluates every request for
supplementation on a case-by-case basis and considers whether
supplementation advances the principles of fairness, truth, or
judicial efficiency.3o A stronger showing3 for one factor may
offset a weaker showing for another factor.3 '
law). Alternatively, in a case in which the "new situation demands one result only, and
discretion could not be exercised either way," the court of appeals may choose to
supplement the record with information about the new facts rather than to remand the case
to the district court. Korn v. FranchardCorp., 456 F.2d 1206, 1208 (2d Cir. 1972) (taking
into consideration a recent substitution of attorneys, which "drastically alter[ed] the nature
of the case"); but see Natl. Wildlhfe Fedn. v. Natl. Marine Fisheries Serv., 422 F.3d 782,

799-800 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[Wle conclude that there are issues that have arisen after the
issuance of the preliminary injunction that may require modification of the district court
order. It is inappropriate for us to decide those questions for the first time on appeal, and
we therefore deny the parties' motions to supplement the record.").
28. See supra n. 27 (collecting cases) and accompanying text.
29. A federal court of appeals may also exercise its inherent equitable authority to
supplement the record with facts that divest it of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Lowry,
329 F.3d at 1024 (pointing out that "[c]onsideration of new facts may even be mandatory,
for example, when developments render a controversy moot and thus divest us of
jurisdiction"); Acumed, 561 F.3d at 226 n. 25 (recognizing that "sometimes a case becomes
moot on appeal by reason of circumstances arising after the completion of a case in a
district court," and noting that "[s]uch circumstances can and should be brought to the
attention of the court of appeals"). Only post-judgment changes in the facts, however, can
be supplemented and considered if the question of subject-matter jurisdiction was already
before the district court. Compare Cabalcetav. Standard Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1555

(11th Cir. 1989) (describing the consideration of "the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction" as requiring "a consideration of all relevant information . . . necessary to
make an informed and final decision," and concluding that "[i]n the interest [ofj judicial
economy, supplementation is necessary for a final disposition of this issue and to avoid
remand on all issues"), with Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 601 F.3d at 1110 n. 11 (denying
motion to supplement the record with facts that show the case was moot before the trial
court's judgment). If the question of subject-matter jurisdiction was not before the district
court at the time of the disputed decision, the court of appeals may consider the factseven though they were not a part of the district court record-because it is deciding
whether the case before it is moot, rather than reviewing the district court's decision. See
Cedar Coal Co. v. UMW, 560 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 1977) ("We think [the evidence]
may be considered in ascertaining whether the cases are moot .... because there was no
mootness question before the district court, so we are not reviewing that. Rather, we are
deciding whether the cases are now moot."); but see KNC Investments, LLC v. Lane's End

Stallions, Inc., 504 Fed. Appx. 467, 468 (6th Cir. 2012) (remanding to the district court for
a determination of whether "factual events" that occurred after the district court's decision
rendered the controversy moot because the "district court is best suited to find any relevant
facts and to determine in the first instance whether a live controversy remains").
30. In Ross, the Eleventh Circuit articulated three factors that courts should consider in
determining whether to exercise their inherent equitable authority to supplement the record:
(1) whether "acceptance of the proffered material into the record would establish beyond
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In Scenario 1, a strong case can be made for supplementing
the record because including the materials bears heavily on the
fairness of the adjudication. At least two federal courts of
appeals have permitted supplementation when misconduct by
the non-proffering party directly caused the proffered materials
to be absent from the district court record. In Ross, a habeas
case, the Eleventh Circuit remanded for supplementation when
state officials misrepresented their custody of the evidence in
question, thereby preventing its earlier discovery and
introduction into the state trial court and federal district court
records. 32 In Mangini v. United States, the Ninth Circuit
permitted supplementation because the non-proffering party's
failure to provide all the relevant facts when a district court
judge's impartiality was called into question deprived the district
court judge "of the opportunity to exercise informed discretion"
in determining whether he should have disqualified himself from
adjudicating the case.33 In both Ross and Mangini, however, the
any doubt the proper resolution of the pending issue," (2) whether remand of the case
would be "contrary to both the interests of justice and the efficient use of judicial
resources," and (3) whether the inherent judicial powers of the court in habeas petitions
dictate supplementation. Ross, 785 F.2d at 1475 (quoting Dickerson v. Ala., 667 F.2d 1364,
1367, 1368 (11th Cir. 1982)). These Ross factors, coupled with factors considered by other
federal courts of appeals when exercising their inherent equitable authority to supplement
the record, relate conceptually to the advancement of principles fundamental to the
function of the judiciary: fairness, truth, and judicial efficiency. See Warren v. Pollard,
2012 WL 3234999, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 6, 2012) (referring to inherent equitable power
and concluding that a court "may enlarge the record in unique cases when it believes the
interests of justice are at stake").
31. See Gibson, 744 F.2d at 405 n. 3 (quoting Dickerson and exercising inherent
equitable authority to supplement the record because the "proper resolution of [the] issue is
not in doubt, and remanding to the district court 'would be contrary to both the interests of
justice and the efficient use of judicial resources"'); Cabalceta, 883 F.2d at 1555
(recognizing that an application of the Ross factors "militates toward a denial" of the
request to supplement, but deciding that "the overall circumstances compel the court to
allow supplementation"); Ross, 785 F.2d at 1475-77 (exercising inherent authority to
supplement the record because the "interests of justice will best be served" due to the
misrepresentation by state officials, even though there was no showing of the first Ross
factor).
32. 785 F.2d at 1474-78.
33. 314 F.3d 1158, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2003) (permitting supplementation of the record
with documents establishing that the district judge's brother-in-law had acted as a lawyer
for one of the parties below, although he had apparently not appeared before the judge,
who was unaware of his relative's participation in the case). The Mangini court did not
discuss under what authority the court permitted the supplementation, but it is likely that
the record was supplemented under the court's inherent equitable authority because the
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court seemed to infer bad faith on the part of the party that had
withheld the proffered materials. It is unclear whether an honest
mistake (e.g., oversight) by opposing counsel in Scenario 1 will
be enough to invoke the court's inherent equitable authority.
B. Scenario 2
In dismissing on summary judgment a wrongful death
action brought by your client, the court held that a
reasonable trier of fact could not find that the defendant
caused your client's spouse's death. A witness comes
forward willing to testify that the defendant has confessed
to intentionally killing the spouse. On appeal, is there
anything you can do to introduce the new witness's
affidavit?
1. InherentEquitableAuthority
FRAP 10(e)(2)(C) and FRE 201 are unlikely to apply in
this case, as the omission was not inadvertent and you are not
seeking to introduce highly indisputable facts. Under their
inherent equitable authority, however, at least two federal courts
of appeals have relied on the truth-seeking function of the
judiciary to permit supplementation of evidence disputed by
both parties. In Colbert, the D.C. Circuit permitted
supplementation because the proffered front side of a receipt,
not entered into the district court record with its reverse side,
went "to the heart of the contested issue" and pretending that it
did not exist would have been "inconsistent with [the] court's
own equitable obligations." 34 And, in Schwartz, the Eleventh
Circuit permitted supplementation because the proffered
photographs were clearer copies of the proffering party's
medical records, and allowing their supplementation would aid
the court in "making an informed decision."35
You can argue that, in Scenario 2, the new-witness affidavit
certainly goes to the court's truth-seeking function. But in this
proffered materials would have been unlikely to qualify as having been inadvertently
omitted under FRAP 10(e)(2) or as relevant to a highly indisputable fact under FRE 201.
34. 471 F.3d at 166 (citation omitted).
35. 341 F.3d at 1225 n. 4.
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scenario, unlike in Schwartz and Colbert, there is no direct link
between the evidence in the record and the evidence you seek to
supplement on appeal. While the court in Colbert emphasized
that it would be nonsensical to overlook the existence of
materials that bear heavily on the contested issue, 36 accepting
the same reasoning in this scenario would create an exception
that swallows the rule: An affidavit containing the testimony of
the newly discovered Scenario 2 witness would not be
connected to documents already in the record in the same way as
were the reverse side of the receipt in Colbert or the second set
of photocopies in Schwartz.
C. Scenario 3
In a medical-malpractice action, you want to supplement
the appellate record with your client's x-rays, which were
directly referred to and discussed in other medical records
admitted onto the district court record. On appeal, is there
anything you can do to introduce the x-ray records?
1. Rule 10(e) (2) (C) of the FederalRules ofAppellate Procedure
This is a scenario in which FRAP 10(e)(2)(C) may apply.
To a certain extent, the district court proceedings relied upon the
x-ray records since they were discussed in the medical records
admitted onto the district court record. A federal court of
appeals is likely to permit supplementation under FRAP
10(e)(2)(C) if the proffering party can convince the court that
the x-ray records were inadvertently omitted from the district
court record. If counsel below referenced the materials in a brief
or pleading filed in the district court or during a hearing, the
court of appeals may be more inclined to infer an earlier intent
to include the materials.3 7
Alternatively, Colbert and Schwartz (discussed above in
connection with Scenario 2) suggest that federal courts of
36. Colbert, 471 F.3d at 166.
37. See Ross, 785 F.2d at 1471-72 (indicating that proffering party had relied on
supplemental materials in its pleadings); Brown, 176 F.3d at 1105 n. 2 (indicating that
proffering party had referenced the materials in a motion for summary judgment).
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appeals will be more inclined to exercise their inherent equitable
authority based on a truth-seeking rationale when some form of
the proffered materials was already in the district court record.
In Scenario 3, whether the court will choose to exercise its
inherent equitable authority to supplement the record with the xrays will likely turn on how closely related the proffered
materials are to the medical records already in the record.
D. Scenario 4
Your client has been sentenced to capital punishment for
murder, and you represent him in his habeas petition before
a federal court of appeals. His post-arrest breathalyzer test
results are not a part of the state court record or the district
court habeas record, but you seek their introduction in
support of his assertion of mitigating circumstances (severe
intoxication at the time of committing murder) for reduced
sentencing. Can you introduce the breathalyzer test on
appeal?
1. Inherent EquitableAuthority in Habeas Actions
If supplementation is not already permitted under FRAP
10(e)(2) or FRE 201,39 federal courts of appeals demonstrate
particular leniency with supplementing the record under their
inherent equitable authority in habeas cases. In Brown v.
Watters, the Seventh Circuit used its inherent equitable authority
to permit supplementation of the record with the defendant's
commitment proceedings. 4 0 And in Thompson, the Sixth Circuit
used its inherent equitable authority to permit supplementation
of the record when a proffered deposition was negligently
omitted from the earlier record.4 1
38. See Colbert, 471 F.3d at 166 (noting that the back side of the proffered receipt had
already been introduced into the record); Schwartz, 341 F.3d at 1225 n. 4 (pointing out that
photocopies of the medical records had already been introduced into the record).
39. See supra nn. 14 and 21 and accompanying text (discussing supplementation of the
record in habeas petitions under FRAP 10(e)(2)(C) and FRE 201).
40. 599 F.3d 602, 604 n. I (7th Cir. 2010).
41. 373 F.3d at 691. Thompson suggests that federal courts of appeals may be
particularly generous in granting requests to supplement submitted by petitioners who face
capital punishment. See id. ("Because the evidence here was apparently negligently omitted
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Because Thompson and Brown both involved evidence that
was in the state court record but absent from the district court
record, it is unclear whether a federal court of appeals would
permit supplementing the record in Scenario 4, in which the
breathalyzer test was absent from both the district court and state
court records.
On the one hand, you could invoke the general principle
established by the Supreme Court:
For the writ of habeas corpus . . . to function as an effective

and proper remedy in this context, the court that conducts
the habeas proceeding must have . . . . the authority to

admit and consider relevant exculpatory evidence that was
not introduced during the earlier proceeding. Federal
habeaspetitioners lon have had the means to supplement
the recordon review.
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit has denied
supplementation in a habeas case where the evidence sought to
be introduced was "essentially brand new" and had never been
offered to the state court until after the federal habeas process
had begun.43
E. Scenario 5
In a declaratory judgment action seeking recognition of
your client's adverse possession of a particular plot of farm
land, the complaint is dismissed without leave to amend for
failure to state a claim under FRCP 12(b)(6) because the
complaint alleged insufficient facts to show hostility. Your
. .. and because this is a capital case, we believe that the circumstances of this case merit
consideration of the Sultan deposition pursuant to our equitable power to supplement the
record on appeal, despite the omission of the deposition from the District Court record.").
42. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 786 (2008) (holding that Military Commission
Act's elimination of federal courts' jurisdiction over habeas cases pending at time of
enactment was an unconstitutional suspension of the writ) (emphasis added; citation
omitted). It bears noting, however, that when a state habeas petition preceded the habeas
claim before a federal court of appeals, the Supreme Court has ruled that a petitioner
seeking relief under § 2254(d)(1) is restricted to the record before the state court that
U.S. -, _ 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1399
adjudicated the same claim. Cullen v. Pinholster,_
(2011) (limiting § 2254(d)(1) review to the record in the state court because "[it would be
contrary to [the statutory] purpose to allow a petitioner to overcome an adverse state-court
decision with new evidence introduced in a federal habeas court and reviewed by that court
in the first instance effectively de novo") (emphasis in original).
43. George, 586 F.3d at 486 n. 1.
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client now has uncovered communications showing that the
defendant knew about and prohibited your client's use of
the land in dispute. Can you introduce the new materials on
appeal?
1. InherentEquitableAuthority
In Scenario 5, the lower court has dismissed your client's
complaint on the face of the pleadings without leave to amend.
Federal courts of appeals have held that a plaintiff appealing an
FRCP 12(b)(6) dismissal may request that the court consider
extra-record materials, without assigning them evidentiary
weight, in determining whether the complaint should have been
dismissed without leave to amend. In Orthmann v. Apple River
Campground, Inc.,44 for example, the Seventh Circuit
considered evidence produced during discovery in a parallel
case but never introduced at trial in the case on appeal.
As Judge Posner explained in Orthmann, although the
materials presented for the first time on appeal were "no part of
the official record," the appellant, hoping "to show that the
complaint should not have been dismissed on its face" could
present "an unsubstantiated version of the events," so long as
that story "was not inconsistent with the allegations of the
complaint." 45 The supplemental materials had, he noted, "no
standing as evidence but [were] usable to show how the accident
might have happened."4 6 Thus, here in Scenario 5, you should
be able to rely on the recently discovered communications, not
as record evidence, but to show how hostility might have been
established and, accordingly, why the district court should not
have dismissed your client's complaint on its face without leave
to amend.

44. 757 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1985); see also Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino
Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 177 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that "as the complaint references and
relies on the content of certain documents," the court would "consider them" on appeal);
Highsmith v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 18 F.3d 434, 439 (7th Cir. 1994) ("This court has held
that when reviewing 12(b)(6) motions, we will consider new factual allegations raised for
the first time on appeal provided they are consistent with the complaint.").
45. Orthmann, supra n. 46, at 914-15.
46. Id. at 915.
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III. PROCEDURE FOR REQUESTING SUPPLEMENTATION
A party seeking to supplement the appellate record should
proceed by motion or formal request so that the court and
opposing counsel are properly apprised of the status and
contents of the evidence in question. Improper procedures in
seeking supplementation may invite sanctions. 1 When a federal
court of appeals permits supplementation under FRAP 10(e)(2)
or FRE 201, it directly supplements the record with or takes
judicial notice of the new materials. 49 Upon a request to
supplement the record under the court's inherent equitable
authority, however, a federal court of appeals may remand the
case to the district court to supplement the record; or, if the issue
can be readily decided without remand, the court of appeals may
supplement the record directly to conserve judicial resources.5 0
IV. CONCLUSION
A party seeking to supplement the appellate record with
materials not introduced in the district court record may move or
formally request that a federal court of appeals correct an
inadvertent omission under FRAP 10(e)(2), take judicial notice
of a highly indisputable fact under FRE 201, or expand the
47. See Lowry, 329 F.3d at 1025; Jones v. White, 992 F.2d 1548, 1567 (1lth Cir. 1993)
(noting, in a case in which supplementation was allowed, that it had previously been denied
"when a party ha[d] failed to request leave of this court to supplement a record on appeal or
ha[d] appended material to an appellate brief without filing a motion requesting
supplementation").
48. See e.g. Lowry, 329 F.3d at 1025-26 (imposing monetary sanctions for unilaterally
supplementing the record).
49. See e.g. Brody, 957 F.2d at 1114 n. 4; Crockett, 542 F.3d at 1188 n. 3; White, 588
F.3d at 1137 n. 2; Smith, 297 F.3d at 815.
50. See Colbert, 471 F.3d at 166 ("Normally, supplementation of the record is effected
by remanding the case to the District Court to allow that court to order the introduction of
new evidence. Certainly, we could have remanded this case to the District Court with
instructions to obtain and review [the newly supplemented evidence]. However, remand for
such a ministerial task, which this court easily can perform itself, would serve no good
purpose and would ultimately amount to a waste of judicial resources.") (internal citations
omitted); Gibson, 744 F.2d at 405 n. 3 (quoting Dickerson v. Ala., 667 F.2d 1364, 1367
(1Ith Cir. 1982), and exercising inherent equitable authority to supplement the record when
the "proper resolution of [the] issue is not in doubt, and remanding to the district court
'would be contrary to both the interests of justice and the efficient use of judicial
resources"').
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appellate record under its inherent equitable authority.
Supplementation under FRAP 10(e)(2) is generally limited to
materials relied upon in the district court that would have been
in the district court record but for inadvertent omission. Judicial
notice under FRE 201 is generally limited to highly indisputable
facts or judicial proceedings that bear a direct connection to the
issues on appeal.
A party seeking supplementation with materials that do not
fall within the scope of FRAP 10(e)(2) or FRE 201 can seek to
invoke the courts' inherent equitable authority to supplement the
record. The federal courts of appeals generally exercise their
inherent equitable authority to permit supplementation if (1)
post-judgment changes in the law affect the suitability of the
outcome, (2) post-judgment changes in the facts alter the
suitability of injunctive relief, (3) post-judgment changes in the
facts divest the court of its subject-matter jurisdiction, or (4) the
court is convinced, after factoring in the principles of fairness,
truth, and judicial efficiency, that the balance of equities tips in
favor of supplementation.
So, if the evidence you need to make your case in a federal
court of appeals is not in the district court record, don't despair
without considering these alternatives. Even if you do not meet
the requirements of FRAP 10(e)(2) or FRE 201, you may be
able to persuade the appellate court that fairness, truth, or
judicial efficiency will be served by considering the missing
evidence.

